
^-^-^r^L^CyC^y 



h 




/^ft&Xs 




Class. 
Book 



__ 



DOCUMENTS 

AND 

FACTS, 




RELATIVE TO 



MILITARY EYENTS, 

DURING THE LATE WAR. 



In the reduction of the army at the conclusion of the 
war, and in adapting our military establishment to 
the circumstances and wants of a time of peace, it was 
the fortune of Gen. Boyd not to find his name among 
the officers retained. The exclusion of an officer of 
experience whose only profession was that of arms ; 
whose life, even from his youth^ had been spent in 
camps and in the hazards of war ; one, too, Who had 
borne an active part in the late war, and whose name 
had necessarily become associated with some of the 
most important events of that period. The exclusion 
of an officer under such circumstances must, almost 
unavoidably, in the mind of the public, carry with it 
-an implied censure. Whether this neglect was mer- 
ited, he must leave to time and the public to deter- 
mine. But he has friends, to whom he is anxious to 
vindicate his military character, and who, in truth, 
will listen to this vindication with pleasure. It is for 
their use that this Memorial is printed, which has been 
unavailingly communicated to the government. It 
contains a more detailed account of the military trans- 
actions of the late war, in which he was personally 
concerned, than has yet been presented to the public ; 
»nd perhaps they may think that the serviees he has 



rendered his country on these occasions, deserved 
some other notice than is contained in the subjoined 
laconic letter from the War Department. 
E 3f$ 

/f - 

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, 
22d May, 1815. 

Inclosed you will receive the National In- 
telligencer, containing a statement of the organiza- 
tion of the military peace establishment of the United 
States, which you will he pleased to consider as com- 
ing authentically from this Department, and act ac- 
cordingly. 

I have the honor to be, 

With great respect, 

Your obedient servant, 

A. J. DALLAS. 
Brigadier Gen. Boyd, 

New York. 

^ oooo — 

The Hon. Wm. H. Crawford, Secretary of War. 

IN presenting myself once more to the attention 
of the National Government, I am aware of assuming 
both a delicate and unpleasant office. It would have 
been far more grateful to have owed the exhibition of 
my claims to the justice and candor of my seniors in 
command. But their indifference and neglect have 
deprived me of so eligible a mode, and imposed on me 
a necessity as painful to myself as it will no doubt be 
irksome to the Government. A sense of imperious 
duty left me no alternative ; the vindication of my 
military character was too dear to me to be neglected ; 
and if the trouble I impose cannot be justified by the 
claims I exhibit, the soldier's love of fame will at least 



furnish an excuse for my weakness. This task, so 
unpleasant at all times, is rendered doubly so by the 
lateness of the application. But it is humbly conceiv- 
ed the merits of a claim cannot be affected by a delay, 
the result of other's omissions ; more especially when 
the delay itself augments the misfortune, and leaves 
in an act of recompense, but a small part of its advan- 
tages. 

Under the conviction of the truth of this sentiment, 
the attention of the Government is respectfully solic- 
ited to some of the facts attending the capture of Fort 
George, to the separate command of that post by the 
undersigned, together with a few reflections on the 
battle at Chrystler's Field. This measure has been 
adopted from a belief that the facts connected with 
the first of those events have never been disclosed to 
your department by the General in command, and 
from an intimation received on one occasion, that such 
a disclosure would have been followed by the object 
of this communication : that, perhaps, the President 
would have thought proper to have conferred on the 
undersigned a brevet as a compliment to his zeal and 
efforts on that occasion. It is the design of the un- 
dersigned to supply such omissions by documents 
which can neither be controverted nor suspected. 
When the merits of that transaction are fully disclos- 
ed to the Government, he will be satisfied ; his con- 
fidence in their justice precludes a doubt that, if any 
individual merit was exhibited, it will still be notic- 
ed, notwithstanding the lapse of time ; and it is to his 
country he refers a question so dear to him, to whose 
judgment, and not to his own, he yields implicit con- 
fidence. 

In performing the duty he has assumed, he begs 
leave to state in a concise manner, the principal events 
of that day, though many of them are already known 
to the Government. On the evening of the S6th of 
May, the enclosed order (A, §.) was promulgated to 



the troops. In obedience to its commands, before 
day-light on the morning of the &7th, the troops were 
embar ;ed and proceeding to the enemy's shore. The 
advance, consisting of about five hundred light troops, 
under the command of Col. Scott, was followed at a 
short interval by Boyd's brigade, 1300 strong ; Win- 
der's and Chandler's brigades successively followed, 
at intervals of perhaps a mile. It was day-light be- 
fore they approached the point of landing, at which 
the enemy were posted on the bank, consisting of two 
thousand regulars, beside militia and Indians, formed 
in order of battle, and covered by a one-gun battery. 
Four armed schooners were ordered to cover our land- 
ing, one of which was brought to bear on the battery 
of the enemy. The advance, under Lieut. Col. Scott, 
were the first to strike the shore, and instantly at- 
tempted the bank, but without success. After the in- 
terval of a moment, Boyd's brigade landed, and the 
bank was carried by the united troops, the whole be- 
ing under his command, as senior officer on shore. 
The contest was animated, and destructive for about 
fifteen minutes, when the enemy broke and fled to the 
town, before any part of Winder's brigade had arriv- 
ed. They were pursued five miles by the troops who 
fought them, and by them only, when the pursuit was 
discontinued by the positive orders of the commanding 
M aj or- Ge neral . 

In this action, the undersigned Was principal com- 
mander ; his brigade and Scott's light troops alone 
fought and beat the enemy: (A. 3.) the remainder of 
the army did not reach the shore till the action was 
decided; the Major- General was still later in arriv- 
ing. From these facts it appears, that the merits or 
demerits of tie battle on shore, are to be referred to 
the undersigned as commander in chief. (A. 4.) In 
estimating' these, he begs leave to inquire, in what 
consists the merit of an action ? Is it in gaining a 
victory ? The rout of the enemy was complete. Is M 



in gaining it with inferior numbers ? The numbers of 
the enemy were one-fourth greater than ours. (A. 8.) 
Is it in gaining it with raw troops against veterans ? 
That the American troops were little more than re- 
cruits, and untried in the field of battle, is too well 
known to require proof; of the character of British 
regulars it is also unnecessary to speak. If more be 
wanted to give merit to an action, than beating supe- 
rior numbers of disciplined troops with untried re- 
cruits, let it consist in the comparative advantages of 
position, in the bravery of the contest, and in the com- 
parative loss sustained. 

The position of the enemy was on the top of the 
bank, fronting the Lake, and presenting a front of 
several hundred yards. Our position was in ap- 
proaching them in broad day, under a fire that shiv- 
ered our crouded boats, and covered the Lake around 
us with foam. It was in the face of such an enemy, 
that we struck the shore, and formed in order of bat- 
tle ; it was under their fire, supported by their batte- 
ries, thai we ascended the steep bank of twenty -five 
feet elevation, up which our cannon were to be drag- 
ged, before they could support us. And it was not 
till all this was accomplished, that the advantages of 
our position could be compared with those of the en- 
emy. 

Was this battle bravely fought by the enemy ?— 
They lined the bank to receive us on our approach : 
their fire was rapid and incessant till we struck the 
shore and mounted the bank : in the few 7 moments of 
interval between the landing of Scott's light troops 
and my brigade, thrice was that gallant officer forced 
down the bank. But this opposition did not cease 
with our landing; for fifteen minutes the two lines in 
front, at a distance of from six to ten yards, exchang- 
ed a distructive and rapid fire, till the determined 
charge of our troops broke their lines and forced them 
into the town, We buried 107 of the enemy on the 



bank where the first stand was made; 105 prisoners 
were taken in the engagement; 175 wounded fell 
into our hands. While it is no less true than aston- 
ishing, that our loss scarcely equalled a quarter part 
of that number. 

In comparing this action with others achieved dur- 
the war, if it will not suffer by the obstacles sur- 
mounted, the dangers incurred, nor the bravery evinc- 
ed ; neither, it is believed, will it in the importance 
of the consequences. Beside teaching our enemies 
that the new army of America would contest with 
them the palm of victory, against superior numbers 
and great advantages of position ; that it would not 
shrink from a contest, even under circumstances of 
discouraging inferiority ; it conquered a greater ex- 
tent of territory, and captured a larger amount of pro- 
perty than has been effected by any other single ar- 
my during the war. Forts George and Erie, twen- 
ty-five pieces of cannon, and mortars, colours, large 
quantities of ammunition, and supplies, were at the 
same time, the fruits of success and the trophies of 
victory. 

If these brave troops deserve any credit for their 
exertions, it is humbly suggested, that, hitherto, no 
such credit has been given to them. Not a brevet 
was conferred in honor of distinguished individu- 
al merit. Neither from the dispatches of General* 
Dearborn or Lewis, does it appear that the action was 
sustained by these troops any more than by the rest of 
the army. The notorious fact, that the light troops 
under Scott, and Boyd's brigade, alone fought and 
beat the enemy, has never been promulgated by the 
Commanders in Chief. The despatches of General 
Dearborn sanction an inference, that either the action 
was fought by the light troops only, and supported by 
Boyd's and Winder's brigades, or else, that these 
brigades were also engaged, and supported by Chan- 
dler. In General Lewis' letter, dated on the field of 



battle, a statement is made that Scott's and Forsyth's 
commands, supported by Boyd's and Winder's brig- 
ades, sustained the brunt of the action. The same 
language is applied to two different brigades, relative 
to an action so important as that of Fort George, 
when in fact one of them took no part in an action in 
which victory was achieved by the other. (A. 5, 6 &7-) 

The credit due to the undersigned, is a subject he 
refers to with pain and reluctance. But he hopes de- 
licacy may not be violated in expressing a belief 
that his conduct on that day did not disgrace a life 
exclusively devoted to military pursuits, and inured 
to the field of battle ; that he did not shrink from 
his duty, as a leader of untried recruits, to show an 
example in his own person of the conduct he wished 
to inculcate — to unite the duties incumbent on a sol- 
dier, with the conduct required from a General — in 
fine, to be the first in danger, as well as in command. 
Whatever credit he deserved, was fully awarded to 
him by the troops who witnessed his efforts ; and the 
warm, animated, and ardent congratulations of the 
commander in chief, at the close of that day — the 
praises he so feelingly lavished upon him — if not 
grateful from the consciousness of deserving them, 
were so at least from the implied approbation of his 
conduct. They at least sanctioned the proud reflec- 
tion, that in executing a difficult trust, he had dis- 
charged his duty to his country. 

If it be objected that the consequences, notwith- 
standing, were less brilliant than might have been 
expected from our means, permit me to inquire, if 
more ought to or could have been done by the brig- 
ade I had the honor to command, and the light troops 
under Col. Scott ? The same body of troops that 
unassisted, beat the superior foe, alone pursued him, 
and if greater effects would have resulted from a con- 
tinued pursuit, its abandonment cannot be objected to 
one who only acted in obedience to the positive com 



niands of his superior. In suggesting that the un- 
dersigned was not consulted in the plan of the expe- 
dition, he is far from reflecting on the commander in 
chief. He was not authorised to obtrude his advice, 
nor were his superiors bound to consult him ; he was 
satisfied with the honor conferred upon him, in being 
suffered to lead the gallant corps that constituted the 
advance. Neither does he express any opinion against 
the mode of the projected attack. But as far as his 
opinion may be of importance, he respectfully sug- 
gests, that it was freely communicated before the bat- 
tle to Commodore Chauncey, and to Gen. Winder. 
That opinion was in favor of one feigned and two 
real simultaneous attacks ; the former opposite New- 
ark for the purpose of distracting the enemy's atten- 
tion ; of the latter, the first where the invasion oc- 
curred, and the other at a point in the rear of the en- 
emy, and cutting off his retreat. If the plan actually 
executed was a bad one, it cannot be objected to the 
undersigned, because he was not consulted in adopt- 
ing it. If the success was less brilliant than was ex- 
pected, the cause in not beiug ascrihable to him, can- 
not affect a distinct transaction, conducted by him, and 
in which the result, it is humbly presumed, was fully 
adequate to the means confided to him. 

On the fifteenth of July, by the illness of Gen. 
Dearborn, the command of Fort George and its de- 
pendencies, devolved on the undersigned, as senior 
officer present ; but, on the ninth of September, they 
were again speedily assigned to Gen. Wilkinson. 
During this period, he is aware that more w r as ex- 
pected from him than was accomplished ; and he is 
also aware, that such an objection, if well founded, 
would justly have an influence on claims for ser- 
vices previously rendered. He admits, the troops 
during that period were desirous of active enterprize. 
and also that none was executed which could possi- 
bly be avoided. But to the instructions of the War 



Department he looks for a justification of this appar- 
ent inactivity, as irksome to his feelings as it was 
prejudicial to his character. His instructions were 
positive and precise, that during the period of his 
command, he should "pay the utmost attention to the 
instruction and discipline of his troops, and engage 
in no affair with the enemy that could be avoided." 
(B. 1.) How far he obeyed his orders, and fulfilled 
the expectations of his superiors— what difficulties he 
had to surmount — and the force of the enemy against 
whose enterprise he had to guard, may be seen from 
the Documents marked B. 1 to 15. He will barely 
remark, that no exertions were spared to improve the 
discipline of his troops, and his success is perhaps not 
unjustly stated in the declaration of Gen. Miller, that 
"he saw no part of the army during the war, whose 
discipline surpassed that of the troops at Fort George 
during the command of Gen. Boyd." The force of 
the enemy in front of his lines was at all times equal 
to the effective disposable force of his command, and 
considerably superior during the latter period. Af- 
fairs between piquets, of greater or less magnitude, 
were occurring daily, and foraging could only be ac- 
complished within the limits of the enemy, and at 
the hazard of continual contests ; and finally, on the 
24th of August, a general attack was made on his 
lines by the British army of four thousand regulars, 
beside militia and Indians, under the command of Sir 
George Prcvost, and repulsed with considerable loss 
on their part, and very trifling on ours. The under- 
signed claims no merit in this transaction, but Ma- 
jor-General Wilkinson's opinion of the importance of 
* he attack, is freely expressed in his letter of the 23d 
of August ; (B. 12.) and that of the enemy is witnes- 
sed not only by the language of the General Order, 
but by the tact, that the. Governor General of all the 
Canadas hastened with a reinforcement from Kings- 
ton, a distance of several hundred miles, to direct it 



10 

in person. Upon this subject, he will hazard but o^e 
more remark ; that his character has perhaps sustain- 
ed an injury by the publication of the British rumor, 
relative to that event, contained in a letter from Gen. 
Wilkinson, while his own official account, previously 
dispatched to the War Department, was never made 
public. (B. 13 & 15.) 

The importance and responsibility of his command, 
the difficulties in maintaining the post assigned him, 
may be inferred from the fact, that a few days before 
Gen. Dearborn left Fort George, a Council of War 
was summoned to deliberate on a proposition to a- 
bandon the enemy's territory. A prompt decision to 
maintain that post, evinces the gallantry of the army ; 
but the fact, that such a consultation was rendered ne- 
cessary, establishes the belief of its difficulty in the 
apprehension of the Commander. 

The restrictions laid upon the enterprise of this- 
army were so painful to the undersigned, that he 
made constant applications for their removal, from 
the notification of the command devolving upon him, 
till the arrival of Gen. Wilkinson. But they were 
not removed till the 30th of July, (which letter was 
received on the — -»■ day of August) and then the 
permission was limited to the co-operation of the fleet 
In the letter notifying the enlarged authority, the dif- 
ference in the expression, acknowledging those re- 
strictions from those in the letter imposing them, was 
perhaps' calculated to excite a belief that they had been 
mistaken by the undersigned. Whether or not this 
operated to his injury he leaves to others to determine, 
No sooner, however, was this authority enlarged, 
than the expedition was projected to the head of the 
Lake, under Gen. Williams, to attack the enemy in 
the rear, while the troops at the fort made a simulta- 
neous attack in front. The enclosed Documents (B. 9,) 
show the causes of its abandonment. The appearance 
of the enemy's fleet, by producing the absence of Cons* 



11 

modore Cliauncey removed the sole condition on which 
the enterprise was sanctioned by the Government. — . 
The reinforcement of the enemy, and the continued ab- 
sence of Commodore Cliauncey, precluded any new 
enterprise until the undersigned was succeeded by 
Gen. Wilkinson. — (Note A.) 

The public have also been disappointed in the re- 
sult of the affair of the 1 1th November, at Chrystler's 
Fields. They expected the entire destruction of the 
enemy's corps, about two thousand strong, by the 
American army of three times that force. How far 
their expectation was reasonable, the undersigned 
will not venture an opinion : he only suggests a few 
facts, from which an inference may be drawn how far 
any censure was applicable to himself. It was not 
the object of the Commander in Chief to capture or 
even to fight that army if avoidable. This appears 
from his own avowal in his report to the War De- 
partment ; from his despatching General Brown, to- 
gether with the elite of the army, before the battle, 
from his sending into the field only part of the force 
contiguous to the battle ground ; and from sending 
away a valuable part of the flotilla, with the two prin- 
cipal artillery officers during the battle. His dispo- 
sition to avoid even a serious engagement appears al- 
so strongly from the fact, that although the action last- 
ed three hours, the reinforcement of three hundred 
men sent by the Commander in Chief to our assist- 
ance, only arrived at the close of the action. With 
this disposition to avoid a battle, the two Major Gen- 
erals, although confined by indisposition, still contin- 
ued in command. The conduct of tiie undersigned 
is therefore to be estimated by the manner in which 
their commands were executed by him as senior offi- 
cer on shore. The strength of the enemy was esti- 
mated by no one, at less than two thousand men. — 
They were supported by seven pieces of heavy artil- 
lery and nine gun-boats, The whole force under the 



command of the undersigned, who fought on that da}, 
did not exceed one thousand infantry, and three hun- 
dred dragoons and artillery. It was with this force> 
against such an enemy (whose numbers were misap- 
prehended by the commander, as appears by General 
Lewis' letter annexed, C, 1.) he had to execute the 
orders of the Commander in Chief. These were on 
the morning of the eleventh to take up the line of 
march down the river, and if the « enemy should har- 
rass the rear, to turn and beat him back," The troops 
were preparing to move, when the enemy appeared ; 
they were « beaten back," nearly a mile and a half, 
after a severe action, and did not again molest our ad- 
vance, The particulars of this battle have been al- 
ready detailed in my report to the War Department 
of the 29th of April, 1815. If beating an enemy with 
two-thirds his force, he having a strong and well cho- 
sen position, supported by numerous gun boats and 
heavy artillery, deserve censure ; or if fighting him 
with an inferior force, when a superior was at hand, 
be ascribable to him, the undersigned asks no favor 
from his country. The bravery and good conduct of 
the troops actually engaged, Mere seen through an 
unfavorable medium by a disappointed public ; but 
they have the proud satisfaction of deserving the re- 
spect and meeting the applause of their enemies.— 
Some justice is done to their injured feelings, by the 
public declaration of Major Glegg, that this action was 
viewed by the British as one of the most able, fought 
during the war. 

In the above pages, the Government has been pre- 
rented with a general view of the military transac- 
tions during the war, in which the undersigned has 
been engaged. During that period, he has command- 
ed a principal army in the territory of the enemy, in 
the vicinity of his superior forces ; he has command^ 
ed as senior officer in two several engagements, in 
which the character of the American army was mvoly- 



16 

ed, and its safety hazarded by an obstinate contest 
with superior forces. — A life passed in military pur- 
suits from the age of sixteen — a long experience of the 
hazards of war in the field of battle, gave him advan- 
tages in a competition with youth and inexperience. 
With what feelings, then, could he see promoted above 
him Juniors, whom he was in the habit of commanding, 
new to the field of battle, and strangers to experience? 
It was not their superior fortune ; chance had given 
him an equal opportunity to meet the enemies of his 
country; like them he has commanded against supe- 
rior numbers, and the trophies of victory have also 
proved the success, as the destruction of lives has the 
difficulties, of his efforts. Without an opportunity for 
action, he might have found in misfortune a shield for 
obscurity : but events have forced him into public no- 
tice; circumstances of so active a character; situations 
of so great responsibility, have not left him, could not 
leave him indifferent to praise or censure. To have 
discharged his duty, was to have deserved well of 
his country ; to have failed in it was to incur disgrace. 
W 7 hen then — where, has he incurred such disgrace ? 
Was it at Chrystler's fields, when a superior foe was 
beaten, — because the Commanding General could not 
stop to annihilate him? Was it when he commanded 
in Canada, because his petitions to be active were re- 
fused ; because he was only suffered to improve the 
discipline of his troops, but not to lead them to victo- 
ry? Was it on the shores of Lake Ontario, when a 
greater army fled before a less: when veterans- cow- 
ered to recruits, and strength of position yielded to in- 
vincible valor? In the acquisition of territory, and 
munitions of war, in the capture of forts and artillery, 
he could not see the marks of public misfortune. 

Or was it on the plains of Tippecanoe, he has mer- 
ited disgrace and neglect? On those plains, where 
the Commanding General, against his express advice, 



1* 

trusted to the dissembled honesty of Indians, and fell 
into their snare ; where the savage war-cry burst upon 
the stillness of the midnight camp, and the discipline 
of undaunted regulars saved the existence of an army? 
It was a different inference he drew from the plaudits 
of the military bestowed upon him and not upon their 
General. There was nothing like reproach in the 
tones of those voices, when the Indian howl was lost 
in the distance, ascribing their safety "to those brave 
regulars" — The thanks of a Territory for preventing 
the desolation of a frontier had taught him to think on 
one occasion, at least, he had not failed in his duty. 
But to his Government he submits the decision : if he 
was mistaken, he wishes not even the poor acknowl- 
edgment of having risqued his life for his country; 
of aiming, at least, at her benefit, if he should have 
failed in promoting it. 

With much consideration, 

I have the honor to be, Sir, 

Your obedient servant, 

JNO. P. BOYD. 

Boston, January, 1816. 



DOCUMENTS* 



(A. 1.) 

Adjutant General's Office, 
//. ({. Niagara, May 25, 1813. 

Plan of Descent on Canada. j 

General Order. *%%0ly* / ' 

Extract.— « Here follows a detail of the TfcHf, 4'c. #c. for 
the Descent." 

(A. 2.) 

Adjutant General's Office, 
H. Q. Niagara, May 26, 1813. 
After Order — Received at 5 p. m. 
The army will embark at three o'clock to-morrow morn 
ing. — The troops will be up at one, eat their breakfast at two 
and be actually on board their respective boats, ready to move 
&t half after three — Each man will take his blanket and one 
day's ration, ready cooked. By command, 

E. BE BEE, Assist. Adj. Gen. 

(A. 3.) 

Camp, Four Mile Creek, 6 p. m 
Niagara, May 26, 1813. 

BRIGADE ORDKR. 
Conformably to the General Orders of the 25th and 26tH 
inst. [This order was received at 5 p. m. until which hour the 
boats had not been designated for each regiment or brigade.] 
The first brigade will embark in boats at 3 o'clock to-morrow 
morning — The several regiments will hold themselves in readi- 
ness accordingly. The boats of the brigade will form in three- 
lines, succeeding Lt. Col. Scott's advance party. The 6th re- 
giment formed in column of battalion right in front, will pre- 
cede, the 13th and 16th regiments will successively follow in 
the same order — Lt. Col. M'Clure's volunteers will flank the 
right of the brigade and move accordingly — Four pieces of 
light artillery to move in the rear of the 15th regiment and four 
in the rear of the 16th regiment. The first four to form im- 
mediately on landing on (he right of the 15th regiment, and the 
other four on the right of *he 16th regiment. 



16 

The troops -will land in order, and form immediately in or 
der of battle. Col. Miller of the 6th, on the right — Major 
King of the 15th, in the centre^ and Col. Pierce of the 16th, on 
the left — M'CIure's volunteers to flank the right. 

The boat of the Brigadier General will be designated by a 
green bough — The commanding officers of regiments, by their 
regimental standards — -to guard the stores and camp equipage 
of each regiment, a commanding officer, and a sufficient num- 
ber of non-eft'ecting will be detained. The commanding officers 
of regiments will be responsible that their boats are in perfect 
readiness to receive the troops. 

JC n V^oops%jvhich compose the first brigade, have already 
once triumphed over the foe they have now again to encounter — 
their country expects much from them, and will not be disap- 
pointed with their accustomed bravery; they will plant the 
United States' Flag in the territory of Canada. 

J NO. P. BO YD, 

Brigadier Gtncral Commanding 1st Brigade, 

(A. 4.) 

Extract of Maj. Gen. L&rris 9 letter to the Secretary of JFar. 

"Of General Boyd, I feel it a duty to do justice to his in- 
trepid conduct at the landing of our troops on the Canada shore 
at Niagara. His brigade made the landing tinder a heavy tire 
of mtisquetry. — It was instantly formed, and he led it up the 
bank with great gallantry, and was the first himself to gain it.'' 

(A. 5.) 

Gen. P. B. Porter's letter to the President of the U. States. 

Sir,— At the taking of Fort George, on the 27th May, 
1S13, I acted as volunteer Aid de Camp, to Maj. Gen. Lewis, 
which atlbrded me an opportunity, not only of knowing the 
place of operation, but of observing particularly, the manner 
in which it was executed, and it gives me pleasure to state, 
what I saw, and what was said, on that occasion, of the con 
duct of Gen. Boyd. 

The landing on the enemy's shore was effected in the face of 
the whole British army, who opposed a spirited, but short re 
sistance. 

The American troops landed in succession, 1st. the advance 
on the ri^ht, under the command of Lt. Col. Scott; 2d. Boyd's 
brigade; 3d. Winder's, and lastly, Chandler's. The landing of 
Gen. Boyd's brigade, was effected (as well also that of Scott's 
command) under a heavy shower of musquetry, from the enemy 



47 

who lay on the margin of the lake. — But such was the promp- 
titude and order with which the troops were formed and led into 
action, that the enemy wa.sbeaten by the time Winder's brigade 
began to debark. 

Gen. Boyd and his brigade participated largely in the well 
earned honors of that day, and the expedition and order with 
which his brigade landed and formed, and the personal gallantry 
which he displayed in leading them up the bank to the attack, 
was spoken of throughout the army in terms of the highest 
commendation. 

With consideration and respect, I have the honor to be. your 
Excellency's most obt. ser. PETER B. PORTER. 

(A. 6.) 
Gen. Millek's letter to a General in Boston. 
Dear Sir — To the several questions respecting the mili- 
tary talents of your friend, Gen. Boyd — I have the satisfaction 
to state, that the 4th, Gen Boyd's regiment, when the command 
devolved on me at Vincennes, on the departure of Gen. Boyd 
lor Washington, excelled in' discipline and police any regi- 
ment I have ever seen in our army. 

I served in his brigade at the capture of Fort George on the 
Niagara, lit. Col. Scott, led the advance and struck the shore 
first, followed immediately by our brigade which lauded in suc- 
cession from right to left, and formed under a most destructive 
fire of musquetry from the enemy, who lined the bank for some 
hundred yards.— ^The contest was principally, or all over, before 
any other brigade landed. 

Gen. Boyd was the senior officer on shore. T have ever con- 
sidered his conduct on that occasion brave, animating, intrepid, 
and officer like. 

He was among the first to ascend the bank of the lake, and 
proclaimed our victory by three cheers. 

My impression is that the contest continued warm for about 
fifteeu minutes. Three musket shot hit Gen. Boyd's clothes. 
He used every exertion to inspire them under his command with 
a zeal for victory, and I considered him entitled to a prominent 
share of the honor of the day. If this victory had been follow- 
ed up after the other brigade had landed,* as Ought to have 
been done, it would been one of the first and most brilliant 
achievements during the war. 

While Gen. Boyd commanded at Fort George, after the de- 
parture of Maj. Gen. Dearborn, he was indefatigable in his at- 
tention to the discipline of the troops and police of the camp. 

Very respectfully, dear sir, your ob"t. serv't. 

JAMES MILLER, 

Brigadier General United Statet Army, 

* After the other brigade landed. Gen, Lewis c?.me on shore: 
3 



18 / 

(A. 7.) 

GEN. MILLER SPEAKING OF THE CAPTURE OF FORT GEORGE-SAYS, 

"General Boyd inspired the whole by his zealous and 
animating conduct. He rushed up the steep bank at the head 
of his brigade, when after about fifteen minutes sharp fighting, 
the charge was given and tbe enemy fled. 

"Gen. Boyd was senior officer in the battle and proclaimed the 
victory by three cheers — to him and Scott, the army ac- 
knowledged a preeminent claim to the honors achieved. 

"This conquest he ever considered one of the most brilliant 
achievements during the war, the sortie at Fort Erie excepted. 

" While Gen. Boyd commanded at Fort George, after the de- 
parture of Gen. Dearborn, he introduced and established as 
high a state of discipline and police, as ever existed in our 
army, at any period of the war." 

(A. 8.) 

From a British official report of the troops stationed between Fort George and Eric, 5th May 
• 1813, which fell into our hands at the capture of Fort George, and now in the possession 
"of General Boyd; it appears that they numbered on that day (twenty-two days previous to 
the battle) 1925 regulars, of whom 1841 were effectives. 

"These troops with the exception of a small garrison left 
at Fort Erie, were concentrated at Fort George, before the bat- 
tle was fought, and were in all probability reinforced from the 
known intention of an attack by the American army. The 
militia and Indians known to have been in the battle not in- 
cluded." 



(B. 1.) 

War Department, July 7, 1813. 

Sir — General Dearborn being about to withdraw from the com- 
mand of the army, until his health shall be re-established, this trust 
will devolve upon you, as the senior officer, until the arrival of 
some person to whom it will be specially assigned. Daring this pe- 
riod, you will pay the u>.nost attention to the instruction and disci- 
pline of the troops, and engage in no affair with the enemy, that 
can be avoided. The orders of Generals Hampton and Lewis, you 
will obey. 

I am, Sir, with great respect, your most obedient servant, 

JOHN ARMSTRONG. 

Brig. Gen. Jno. P. Boyd, Fort George. 



19 

(B. 2.) 

Fort George, U.Canada, July 15, 1813. 
Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary at War. 

Sir — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your com- 
mands of the 7th inst. and to inform you that Gen. Dearborn left 
camp this afternoon. Conformably to your orders, I have as- 
sumed the command of the army at this post. 

It now becomes my duty to report to you the want of officers to 
this section of our army. Not long since, when our army was in 
high health, and elated with victory, we had two Major Generals, 
and three Brigadier Generals ; now, our force diminished by pris- 
oners, sickness and deaths, is left almost destitute. The enemy 
have been able, during our inactivity, to recruit his effective force, 
of regulars, militia and Indians. 

" 1 shall adhere to your instructions, which prohibit an engage- 
ment with the enemy, when avoidable, &c." 

(B. 3.) 

Extract of a letter from Brigadier General Boyd, to the Secretary 
of War, dated 

" Fort George, July 22, 1813. 
" I now conceive it my duty to say, that when Gens. Dearborn 
and Lewis were in command, .they did not think it necessary to 
consult a subordinate ; 1 therefore am not in possession of any in-* 
formation relative to the present campaign ; or instructions for 
my own government," 

(B. 4.) 

Extract of a letter from Brigadier General Boyd, to Commodore 
Chauncey, dated 

" Fort George, July 22, 1813. 
" Allow me once more to remark, that the presence of the fleet, 
or part of it, would enable us to act against the enemy with great 
effect." 

(B. 5.) 

Extract of a letter from Brigadier General Boyd, to the Secretary 
of War, dated 

" Fort George, July 24, 1813. 
" We are anxiously expecting the fleet, with whose co-opera- 
tion the enemy's annihilation would be certain." 

(B. 6.) 

Extract of a letter from Brigadier General Boyd, to tlic Secretary 
of War, dated 

" Fort George, July 27, 1813. 
" Our troops are becoming more healthy, and anxious to be 
moving." 



so 

(B. 7.) 

Extract of a letter from Brig. Gen. Jno. P. Boyd, to the Hen, Sec- 
retary of War, dated 

" Fort George, August 4, 1813. 
" Since I had the honor to address you last, two deserters have, 
come in from the enemy, by whom we learn that he is entrenching 
in the woods, in expectation of an attack, rather than having an 
intention to make one himself. His position in the woods, where 
his red auxiliaries are so formidable, may render him strong. But 
we trust, when you shall deem it proper to allow the army to act 
offensively, that we shall be able to dislodge, perhaps with the co- 
operation of the fleet, to capture, or drive him to his strong hold 
at the head of the Lake." 

(B. 8.) 

Hon. Secretary of War's letter, (ajter repeated application from Gen, 
Boyd to allow him to act.) 

War Department, July 30, 1813„ 

Sir — The restrictions put upon you with regard to the enemy, 
were but commensurate with the enemy's command of the lake. 
So long as they had wings, and you had only feet, so long as they 
could be transported, supplied, and reinforced by water, and at 
will, common sense, as well as military principles, put you on the 
defensive. These circumstances changed, the reason of the rule 
changes with them ; and it now becomes your business, in con- 
cert with the fleet, to harrass and destroy the enemy, wherever 
you can find him. Of the competency of your force, there can 
be no doubt, provided your estimate of his be but tolerably cor- 
rect. A general plan of campaign, formed upon existing circum- 
stances, is under deliberation, and will be forwarded by the next 
mail. 

I am, Sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, 

J. ARMSTRONG. 

Brig. Gen. John P. Boyd, Niagara. 

(B. 9.) 

Head Quarters, Fort George, Jug. 8, 1813. 
Hon. John Armstrong, Sec. of War. 

Sir — By Thursday's mail, I had the honor to receive your 
commands of the 30th. 

Conceiving myself at liberty to act offensively on the arrival of 
the fleet, an expedition was immediately concerted, against the 
enemy, and acceded to by Commodore Chauncey. 1000 men 
were to embark on board the fleet, under the command of Briga- 
dier Gen. Williams, to land at the head of the Lake. The army 
at this place was to move in two column^, against the enemy's 



21 

kont, While Gen. W. assailed his rear and cut off his retreat. Yester- 
day morning, when the troops were to have embarked, the enemy's 
fleet was discovered off this place. Com. Chauncey weighed an- 
chor, approached him, and by every indication that a leeward 
position would afford, offered to engage. Sir James, after 
manoeeuvring some time at a distance, bore away for the head of 
the Lake, whither he was pursued by the Commodore. This 
morning our fleet is seen off in the Lake, while the enemy is near 
the shore, on which his army is encamped, still having the wind 
in his favor. 

1 am sorry to be obliged to report that the unusually warm 
weather has encreased our sick list. The officers in particular 
have suffered. 

With much respect, I have the honor to be, Sir, your obedient 
servant, JNO P. BOYD, Brig. Gen. Com. 

(B. 10.) 

Extract of a letter from Gen. Boyd, to the Hon. Secretary of War. 

" Head Quarters, Fort George, Aug. 12, 1813. 
" Commodore Chauncey is still in pursuit of the enemy. This 
circumstance has necessarily delayed the attack on the enemy, 
which was contemplated in my address of the 8th inst. Gen. Por^ 
ter is assembling a body of volunteers and Indians, at Buffaloe, 
with a view to have co-operated in this enterprise. He will 
probably be here soon. Any thing which can be effected, withy 
out the fleet, shall be attempted. To attack the enemy, without be- 
ing able to cut off his retreat, would be only to " beat, without cap- 
turing him" 

(B. 11.) 

Extract of a letter from Gen. Boyd, to the Hon, Secretary of War. 

"Fort George, Aug. 16, 1813. 

" I had the honor to address you on the 12th inst. since which 
time nothing of importance has occurred. Commodore Chauncey 
has left this part of the Lake, and the enemy have now so far (he 
ascendancy, as to render the proposed enterprise against the land 
forces, impracticable." 

(B. 12.) 

Gen. Wilkinson's Letter to J. P. Boyd. 

Head Quarters, Sockets Harbor, 
Jug. 23, 1813, 7 o'clock, i J . M. 
Sir — I have this evening received information to be relit d on, 
that Sir George Pre vost was met, on the 18th inst. about [>0 miles 
north of York, pressing forward with an aid-de-camp, and a light 



escort of cavalry, for jour neighborhood. Aad on the 21st, a de- 
tachment of regular troops in boats, were met between Earnest- 
Town and Hamilton, bound up the Lake. 

These movements indicate some extraordinary enterprise, and 
therefore I dispatch a courier, to reach you in forty hours, if pos- 
sible, that you may be prepared at all points to meet the bayonet. 

Were I to hazard a conjecture, I should say, he intends a stroke 
on Niagara, and your batteries and magazines east of the Strait. 
Be attentive to those points, and bear in mind, that their loss 
would disgrace our arms, blast your cause, and ruin the campaign. 
Be prepared at all quarters; spurn the thought of yielding to num- 
bers, and your character will be exalted, on the discomfiture of a 
distinguished chief.* 

With consideration and respect, Sir, vour obedient servant, 

JAMES WILKINSON. 

Brig. Gen. J. P. Boyd, commanding at Fort, George. 

* Sir George made his attack, and was repulsed-— on the 24th. 

(B. 13.) 

Head Quarters, Fort George, Aug. 29, 1813. 
Hon. John Armstrong, 

Sir — I had the honor to address you on the 24th inst. The 
troops had not then ceased to skirmish in the woods. In the repulse 
of Sir George, our loss was greater than was then reported, hav* 
ing five killed, and twenty-seven missing. The enemy suffered 
more in killed, and left in our hands one captain of the 49th regt. 
and six privates, prisoners. The attack was made by the ene- 
my's whole force, with the intention, no doubt, should he fail in 
an attempt on our intrenchments, to draw us into the woods.— 
Gen. Williams, with a part of his brigade, advanced some dis- 
tance into the plain, but it was conceived inexpedient to pursue 
the enemy into the woods, when he retired. 

With much consideration and respect, I have the honor to be, 
Sir. yours, &c. &c. 

JNO, P. BOYD. 

(B. 14.) 

Head Quarters, Fort George, Sept. 9, 1813. 

Hon. John Armstrong, 

Si r — « I have the honor to report the arrival of Major Gen. 
WiJkinson." 

I have the honor, &c. &c. 

J. P. BOYD, B. G. commanding, 



23 

(B. 15.) 

Extract of a letter from General Wilkinson, to the Secretary of War, 

dated, 

" Sacket's Harbor, Aug. 30, 1813. 
" Sir — I have commenced barely, the arrangement of the de< 
partment of intelligence. An intelligencer left Kingston or its 
v icinity, last evening, to tell me that Sir George Prevost com- 
menced his operations against Boyd, and had driven in his pic- 
quets, and talcen sixty or seventy prisoners, but had been repidsed." 

(C. 1.) 

Extract of a letter from Major Gen. Lewis, to Gen. Boyd, on the 
subject of the battle of Chrystler's field. 
" Your force certainly did not exceed one thousand infantiy, 
and three hundred dragoons and artillery. The reinforcement 
which marched towards evening to support you, were too late for 
any effective aid, and my inspector informed me, consisted only of 
about three hundred men. The enemy was certainly driven back, 
and effected no object." 

(C. 2.) 

Extract of a letter from Brig. Gm. S7vift, {who was in the action) 
to an officer in Washington. 
" Hearing many remarks, as to the campaign of 1813, down the 
St. Lawrence, I think it proper to mention to you that relative to 
the affair of the 11th November, at Chrystler's field, no one 
doubts Gen. Boyd's having fought with his usual bravery on that 
day ; in my opinion, a more zealous and brave officer than Gen. 
Boyd, never placed himself at the head of a column." 

(C. 3.) 

Head Quarters, 3d Military District, 
New-York, April 29, 1813. 

To the hon. Secretary of War. 

SIR — In justice to myself and the troops I had the honor to 
lead at the battle of Chrystler's Field, I deem it proper, even at 
this late hour, to report an impartial statement of that event. 

The public has misapprehended my situation and made me un- 
deservedly responsible for events that occurred under the com- 
mander in chief, and my reputation may perhaps have suffered for 
disasters which could not be attributable to me. 

At the commencement of the campaign, whilst preparing to leave 
Fort George, even at Sacket's Harbor, and down to the moment of 
leaving Grenadier's Island, I was kept in ignorance of the pending 



Expedition and of the mode in which it was to be effected.-— 
Afterwards, while descending the St. Lawrence, the frequent in- 
disposition of the two Generals often threw the command on me, 
without the possession of any of those facts relative to the object 
of our movements or the situation and strength of the enemy, so 
important for the execution of my duties. 

On the 9th inst. Gen. Brown, the elite corps and the dragoons 
(who had joined us and crossed over) moved by land on the Can- 
ada shore; the residue of the army embarked and proceeded by wa- 
ter ; the whole rendezvoused at Chrystler's field at 2 o'clock. Late 
at night, without having had any direction of the order of landing, 
or any knowledge of the relative situation of the troops, a verbal 
order from the commander in chief suddenly informed me, that in 
consequenoe of the extreme ill health of himself and of Gen. Lewis, 
both being confined to their boats, the command on shore devolved 
on me, and that the enemy's gun boats and a body of troops by land 
were approaching our rear. Arrangements were immediately made 
for their reception. 

Early next morning (10th) conformably to the commander in 
chief's order, Gen. Brown was detached with a strong portion of 
the army and directed to pursue his course down the r;ver to dis- 
lodge some militia, supposed to be intercepting the route to Corn- 
wall. It was my decided opinion that the army should not be de- 
tached. I did not express this to Gen. Wilkinson, for my counsel 
was seldom or never required. 

The rear guard consisting of parts of the 1st, 2d and 4th brigades, 
a squadron of dragoons and two pieces of artillery under the com- 
mand of Brig. Gen. Boyd, destined to cover the flotilla, was di- 
rected to follow as soon as the boats should put off — "should the 
enemy hang on the rear, advance, beat him back." Nothing was 
left to the discretion of Gen. Boyd. Gen. Wilkinson's health was 
such as to confine him to his cabin, and I had not seen him for 
several days. Yet, ambitious to be first in the service of his coun- 
try, he tenaciously held the command. 

The column had taken up the line of march, and proceeded a- 
bout two miles, when Col. Biss?!l, of the 5th regiment, was detached 
from the first brigade, and ordered by the commander in chief to 
reembark and disperse a party of the enemy, supposed to have made 
a lodgment on one of the islands. Ere this could be executed, a 
videt from Capt. Selden from the rear, reported a column of 1500 
of the enemy approaching in that direction. The detachment was 
immediately brought to the right about, marched up the river and 
formed in line of battle. 

Gen. Lewis landed and came to the field, viewed our position, 
gave some directions and returned to his boat. I pushed forward 
with Capt. Selden's dragoons to reconnoitre the enemy — he open- 
ed his artillery, our line advanced, skirmished, and the enemy re- 



23 

tired. Aftor a ^ong, harrassing and stormy day, the troops were di- 
rected °y an order from Gen. Lewis to return and take post for 
tfie night (which was inclemently stormy) so as to cover the flo- 
tilla. Late in the evening I waited on Gen. W. on board his 
boat, to report the events of the day, to receive orders for the 
night, and to ascertain who commanded. The general was so in- 
disposed that I was not permitted to see him, and was directed to 
call on General Lewis, whose boat I boarded and received orders 
to defend my position and the flotilla. Early the next morning, 
(lltb) Gen. Lewis sent an aid ordcriug us to move down the riv- 
er. The troops were put in motion, the commander in chief ar- 
rested their march. At 10 o'clock the enemy's gun boats turned a 
point and commenced a cannonade on our boats, without any effect 
on either side. During the fore part of the day a variety of verbal 
orders were received, but countermanded before executed, occa- 
sioned, as I understood, by the want of information from General 
Brown. At 12 o'clock, impatient for some decisive or discretionary 
orders, the troops having been nearly 48 hours under arms, expo- 
sed to incessant rains, I rode to the bank of the river, requested and 
obtained a specific order, written by pencil, " that the flotilla 
would put off in 20 minutes — 4 pieces of artillery would be landed 
to reinforce the rearguard, which would follow the boats — should 
the enemy harrass the rear, turn and beat him back." While ex- 
pecting the signal for moving, report from the rear announced the 
approach of the enemy in the woods which intersected the fields 
and were flanking our right. Gen. Swartwout was directed to dis- 
perse them, Gen. Covington to support him. Swartwout dashed 
into the woods and drove the advance back to the main body. — 
Here he was joined by Covington. The enemy had judiciously 
chosen his ground among deep ravines of an extensive plain be- 
yond the woods, and discharged a heavy and destructive fire on 
our advance columns. No opposition could check the invincible 
ardor of our troops. By resolute and repeated charges, the enemy 
were driven more than a mile, disputing every inch of ground. — 
Colonel Coles with a detachment of Boyd's brigade came up, and 
was immediately directed to turn the enemy's left flank, which was 
promptly executed amidst a shower of musketry and shrapnell 
shells. Two pieces of artillery under Capt. Irvine now r arrived 
in the field, which had been delayed by a circuitous route ; the 
four other pieces which were landed, reached the field soon after, 
and had their effect. The squadron of dragoons, under Major 
Woodford, were early in the field, but the nature of the ground did 
not admit of successful charges. The enemy had now been driven 
under the protection of their gun boats, which supported their right, 
and enfiladed by their numerous and heavy artillery the field in 
front — their left rested on the woods, obliquely to the rear, support- 
ed by light artillery, indians, and incorporated militia. Many of 
our troops beginning to break, and I vainly endeavored to rally 
4< 



26 

them, it became necessary for the whole to fall back, j^d re-form 
out of the range of the enemy's floating batteries, which v>.ms exe- 
cuted without inducing him to move from his strong position. At 
this time a reinforcement of 300 men under Colonel Upham, came 
into the field, whose activity while engaged evinced the benefit 
that might have been derived from their more early assistance. — 
After the troops were re-formed, I received orders to return to the 
ground near the boats, and to embark. A valuable part of the flo- 
tilla and the two principal artillery officers had descended the river 
and joined Gen. Brown at Cornwall, during the action, and many of 
the remaining boats were already in the stream. Had an early 
and sufficient reinforcement come into the field, as was expected, 
the result of this day would have been very different. It is evi- 
dent, throughout, that the Commander in chief acted with a mis- 
apprehension of the force and the designs of the enemy — when the 
action began, it is probable he considered his strength inferior to 
ours, else he would not have retained, in inactivity, so large a force 
in the boats. 

The strength of the enemj r , according to the calculation of the 
principal officer engaged, could not have been less than 2500 men, 
7 pieces artillery, and 9 gun boats (manned from the fleet ;) the 
British prisoners state their strength 2100. Our force, exclusive 
of artillery and dragoons, amounted to not more than 1200 men. 
Though the result of this battle was not so decisive as I could 
have wished, and as the first part of it promised, yet when it is re- 
collected, that the troops had been exposed for four days to incess- 
ant fatigue, and inclement storms, from which they had no sJiclter, 
that we carried into the field so small a force, that the action com- 
menced unexpectedly, and without artillery, and was sustained 
with a cool determined valor never surpassed, for more than three 
hours, and that the enemy were superior in numbers and position, 
it is hoped that this affair may justly be considered as having ad- 
ded new glory to the American arms. The field was crimsoned 
with the blood of 339 killed and wounded, whose d«athe or scars 
will immortalise thi3 day. The names of the officers whose brave- 
ry and activity characterized this conflict, were reported to the 
commander in chief. The praise, however, which was soparsimo- 
niously bestowed on this occasion, but ill accords with their deserts. 
In the account of the enemy, who reported our numbers 7000 men, 
a greater compliment is implied than could be found in the des- 
patches of the commander in chief. 

I would not here again give an useless exhibition of the valor 
and skill which was displayed by many individuals and corps on 
this important day. The time for reward has passed by — those 
who fell must sleep in oblivion, and those who survive conceal their 
scars, which are seen only with indifference. But, I cannot for- 
bear from making one more struggle to rescue the character of 



this army from unmerited aspersion. If it be not entitled to tin 
praise of their country, let it not meet with undeserved neglect^ but 
Teceive the common rewards of justice. 

With much consideration and respect, I have the honor to be, 
sir, your obedient servant, JOHN P. BOYD, 

B. Gen. Coiri'ding. 

(C. 4.) 

Letter of Major Glcgg, Dcp. Adj. Gen. British army, to a gentleman 
in Philadelphia. 

" New York, July 25, 1815. 

" Having been stationed in Upper Canada during the late war, 
and holding the staff appointment of Assistant Adjutant General, 
I may perhaps be permitted to venture «n opinion upon most of 
the military events of that period. I have always regretted that 
it was not my good fortune to have been present at the battle of 
Chrystler's farm, which took place on the left bank of the river St. 
Lawrence, in the month of November, 1813. My regret has 
arisen solely from the circumstance that the operations of that 
day were considered by the distinguished officers present, as con- 
ducted with more science and gallantry, than any that had previ- 
ously taken place in Canada during the war. 

" The event was not only gratifying to the British from its suc- 
cessful result, (a) but it derived much additional interest from hav- 
ing surmounted obstacles which had not been previously encoun- 
tered ; I mean those arising from the good military disposition and 
gallantry, which were equally conspicuous on the part of the ene- 
my. I derive my opinion from information from the principal of- 
ficers engaged, whose written evidence is at present in my pos- 
session. 

" I have been greatly surprised since my arrival in this coun- 
try, on hearing that the battle of Chrystler's farm, was considered 
(&) " disgraceful io the namp nn«l military reputation of America." 
In Canada, it is considered a well contested day, and the fortunate 
result attributable solely to a very decided superiority of (c) discu 
pline and experience. No blame was ever imputed to the Amer- 
ican commanding General." 

(a) The British were beaten back nearly two miles from where the engage- 
ment commenced, and did not follow the Americans when they returned to 
their boats, after the battle, and embarked. 

(b) By fome officers not in the battle. 

(c) Superiority of numbers, position and artillery. 



&/* The following Document should have been placed 
among the documents marked A. after No. 3. 

First Brigade, H. Q. — Newark, May 2S, 1813. 
BRIGADE ORDERS. 
The General commanding the first brigade feels a peculiar 
satisfaction in congratulating the troops on their glorious 
achievement of yesterday. Their conduct was such as entitles 
them to the thanks of their commander, and the gratitude of 
their country. 

Col. Miller of the 6th regiment, deserves great applause for 
steadiness in action, the rapidity with which he supported the 
advance under the gallant Scott—The 13th under Maj. King, 
impatient to share the honors of the day, immediately succeeded 
and formed under a most galling fire — The 16th under Col. 
Pearce urged their boats to the shore and bore an honorable 
participation in the contest.— The light artillery under Col 
Porter, merits the highest credit in bringing them out upon the 
steep bank,&c, — Much was expected from Col. M'Clure's volun 
teers, and the General has not been disappointed. It will be 
his duty as well as inclination to make their claims known to the 
Commander in Chief — as all the troops composing the brigade 
behaved so Well it would be a difficult task to discriminate those 
who were preeminent, but the General cannot suppress his ad- 
miration of the fortitude of Maj. King, who continued to lead 
his regiment through the severity of the contest, long after hav- 
ing received a painful and debilitating wound. — the exertions 
of the officers and men who ascended the bank and formed 
amidst such a destructive fire, excited his admiration and aston- 
ished the enemy: and will convince their countrymen as well as 
foes, that their valor will overcome every resistance. The Gen 
eral will find great satisfaction in obeying the order of *'»c 
Commander in Chief, which required liim to make a "report 
of conspicuous merit, whether found in the commanding officers 
or in the ranks,'' and they may be assured that their distin- 
guished actions shall not pass without proper encomiums — al- 
though the General has not particularised individual merit he 
may perhaps be excused in recording the intrepid couduct of 
his Aid de Camp Lt. Whiting and brigade Maj. Capt. Grafton, 
they have justified his expectations and are entitled to hie 
applause. 

If their is any honor to your Brigadier General, it is his 
having had command of such a valiant baud. 

JNO. P. BOYD, 

Brigadier Gentral Commanding 1st Brigad: 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 




01 1 782 587 5 



